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Abstract—Mobile crowdsensing harnesses the sensing power of modern smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale
of what was previously possible. In a mobile crowdsensing system, it is paramount to incentivize smartphone users to provide sensing
services in a timely and reliable manner. Given sensed information is often valid for a limited period of time, the capability of smartphone
users to execute sensing tasks largely depends on their mobility, which is often uncertain. For this reason, in this paper we propose
IncentMe, a framework that solves this fundamental problem by leveraging game-theoretical reverse auction mechanism design.
After demonstrating that the proposed problem is NP-hard, we derive two mechanisms that are parallelizable and achieve higher
approximation ratio than existing work. IncentMe has been extensively evaluated on a road traffic monitoring application implemented
using mobility traces of taxi cabs in San Francisco, Rome, and Beijing. Results demonstrate that the mechanisms in IncentMe outperform
prior work by improving the efficiency in recruiting participants by 30%.
Index Terms—Mobile, Crowdsensing, Smartphone, Auction, Game Theory, Smartphone, Optimization, Experiments.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
The past few years have witnessed unprecedented prolifer-
ation of smartphones in people’s daily lives; it has been pre-
dicted by Cisco that the total number of smartphones will
be nearly 50 percent of global devices and connections by
2020 [1]. Furthermore, nowadays smartphones are equipped
with a set of cheap but powerful embedded sensors, such as
accelerometer, gyroscope, microphone, and camera.
If all the smartphones on Earth were combined into
a single network, it would form the largest sensor net-
work ever created. We could leverage millions of personal
smartphones and a near-pervasive wireless network infras-
tructure to sense, collect, and analyze data far beyond the
scale of what was possible before, without the need to
deploy thousands of static sensors. This new paradigm is
commonly referred as mobile crowdsensing (MCS). Real-
world applications of MCS that have been already deployed
include monitoring of road traffic [2], environment (e.g., air
and noise) [3], [4], crime [5], and parking systems [6].
In order to obtain meaningful data, most of mobile
crowdsensing applications need people’s active participa-
tion to the sensing process. On the other hand, smartphone
users invest their personal resources while executing sens-
ing tasks. This implies that a user would not be interested
in participating to the crowdsensing process unless she
receives a satisfying reward. To this end, the problem of
incentive mechanism design in mobile crowdsensing has
been extensively studied, as surveyed in [7]–[9]. Briefly, the
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goal of an incentive mechanism is to optimally (i) schedule
sensing tasks to participants; (ii) reward the participants for
their services so as to keep them interested in participating.
T1: Traffic in L1 
at 10:00AM
T2: Traffic in L2 
at 10:10AM
ALICE
BOB
L1
L2
Fig. 1: Example of a crowdsourced navigation app.
Motivations. To the best of our knowledge, existing in-
centive mechanisms implicitly assume that participants will
always be able to perform the sensing tasks once assigned
to them. On the other hand, participants are most often
vehicle drivers, or people commuting to their workplace
through public transportation [7]. Thus, participants’ mobil-
ity largely depends on current traffic conditions and current
vehicle speed, implying that they might not always be able
to execute sensing tasks despite their willingness to do so.
For this reason, to increase the likelihood of successful
execution of the sensing tasks, the aspect of uncertain mobility
should be factored into the incentive mechanism design.
We now discuss an example to further support this point.
Let us consider a (simplified) navigation app with crowd-
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sourced traffic updates, where Alice and Bob are the only
participants (see Figure 1). In such system, the only mobility
information available (obtained through the navigation app)
is Alice and Bob’s current location, their destination (L2),
and their current route. We remark that in this scenario
Alice and Bob’s mobility is uncertain, since their arrival time
and route may change significantly due to changing traffic
conditions. Let us assume the current time is 10:00AM. Let
us also assume the system needs two sensing tasks to be
executed, namely T1 (traffic status in L1 at 10:00AM) and
T2 (traffic status in L2 at 10:10AM). Given Alice and Bob’s
current geographic location and destinations, it would be
reasonable to assign T1 to Alice and T2 to Bob. However,
the system should also consider that it may not be possible
for Bob to execute T2, due to a traffic jam along his route
(see Figure 1), and thus assign T2 to both Alice and Bob.
Challenges. On the other hand, is it feasible from a
budget perspective to assign T2 to Alice and Bob? In other
words, is it possible to devise a mechanism able to schedule
T2 to both Alice and Bob and also provide them with
a satisfying reward, without exceeding a reward budget,
by also considering uncertain mobility? More formally, we
would like to achieve the following (very challenging) de-
sign objectives [10] when designing incentive mechanisms:
• The mechanism must assume that the budget for
recruiting participants is often limited, thus not ev-
ery participant can be hired by the system (i.e., the
mechanisms must be budget-feasible);
• In order to prevent churning, the mechanism must be
truthful and individual-rational, in the sense that it is
the most rational choice for participants to keep par-
ticipating because it is always convenient for them;
• Given the large scale of mobile crowdsensing sys-
tems, the mechanisms must be computationally ef-
ficient, which means the process of selecting and
rewarding participants must have polynomial com-
plexity and be possibly parallelizable.
Novel Contributions. The above mentioned reasons and
challenges motivate our work and the following novel con-
tributions, which are summarized as follows.
• We propose a novel framework named IncentMe
to study and control the interaction between the
mobile crowdsensing platform (MCP) and crowd-
sensing participants with uncertain mobility. These
interactions are modeled as a reverse auction between
a buyer/auctioneer (i.e., the MCP) and a group of
sellers/bidders (i.e., the crowdsensing participants).
Specifically, in our model, participants compete with
each other for being selected to execute sensing
tasks by submitting a bid containing their expected
reward. The MCP uses the auction to select the win-
ning bidders and compute the associated reward, in
such a way that the sum of rewards does not exceed
a budget and the likelihood of sensing task execution
is maximized.
• To optimize the selection and reward algorithms of
our reverse auction, we formulate the novel Bud-
geted Value Maximization Problem (BVM), and math-
ematically prove through reduction that BVM is
an NP-Hard problem. To solve BVM, we leverage
game-theoretical mechanism design [11] to derive two
polynomial-time mechanisms, called by us Truthful
Value Maximization (TVM) and Heuristic Value Maxi-
mization (HVM). We mathematically prove that TVM
and HVM achieve an approximation ratio of ≈ 0.21,
which is to the best of our knowledge the greatest
with respect to the state of the art in the field [12],
[13]. We also mathematically prove that TVM and
HVM guarantee the fundamental properties of truth-
fulness, individual-rationality, and budget-feasibility,
and discuss how to parallelize TVM and HVM to
achieve maximum performance.
• We experimentally evaluate the TVM and HVM auc-
tion mechanisms by considering a road traffic mon-
itoring application where participants with uncer-
tain mobility submit information about traffic events
(e.g., accidents, traffic lines, etc.) during their trips. In
order to realistically implement the application, and
experiment with different mobility patterns, we use
real-world mobility traces of taxi cabs in San Fran-
cisco [14], Rome [15], and Beijing [16]. We also evalu-
ated the performance of HVM when multiple parallel
jobs are used. Experimental results demonstrate that
our mechanisms outperform the state of the art [12],
[13], [17], [18] by improving on the average of 30%
the likelihood of successful task execution, as well as
achieving a significant speedup of about 12x in the
scenarios considered.
Paper Organization. The paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces the system model and the problem def-
inition, while Section 3 presents the budget-feasible mecha-
nisms of IncentMe and Section 4 discusses the experimental
results. Related work is summarized in Section 5, while
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we describe the architecture of IncentMe
as well as mathematically formalize it. Hereafter, we will
refer to the terms “user”, “participant” and “bidder” inter-
changeably, as well as “system” and “MCP”.
The proposed architecture is depicted in Figure 2, con-
sisting of a platform (MCP) which can be accessed through
wireless Internet connection. The interactions between the
participants and the MCP are detailed below.
• Smartphone owners who intend to participate in the
mobile crowdsensing campaign download the mobile
crowdsensing app (step 1) through common markets
such as App Store or Google Play. The app is responsi-
ble for handling data transmission, visualization, and
bidding process.
• Whenever required, the MCP generates a set of sens-
ing tasks that need to be executed (step 2). Sensing
tasks specify a series of requirements, such as the
sampling rate requested, minimum sensing time,
maximum distance from specified location, or task
expiration time.
• When users intend to participate, a bid must be sub-
mitted, which is the minimum amount of reward the
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Fig. 2: Interactions between participants and MCP.
user would like to receive to execute a sensing task
(step 3). The MCP may also collect mobility informa-
tion about the user, which can be used to determine
the user’s availability to perform the sensing tasks.
• After receiving the bids, the MCP runs the auction,
and based on its outcome, selects a subset of par-
ticipants, assigns them the sensing tasks, and com-
municates the reward assigned to each user (step 4).
After being selected and having received the list of
sensing tasks to be executed, a participant is allowed
to begin performing the sensing service (step 5).
After the sensing tasks have been executed and the
sensed data collected, the MCP rewards each user the
amount in step 4 (step 6).
Example of Use Case of IncentMe. Consider a navi-
gation app where the system crowdsources traffic-related
info, similar to the example discussed in the Introduction.
To participate, drivers download the app and register to the
system, by providing (i) payment credential for depositing
rewards, (ii) minimum reward for submitting each traffic
report, and (iii) frequency of traffic report submission. Such
info can be changed later by going to the Settings page
of the app. Whenever a new trip begins, a driver enters
the destination location by using the smartphone app (start
location is automatically retrieved from GPS), and a bid is
automatically submitted to the MCP as follows:
• Name: Alice Jones
• Unique ID: 1242760243
• Trip Start: 122 W 12th Street, Manhattan, NYC
• Trip End: 345 E 57th Street, Manhattan, NYC
• Reward: Minimum $0.1 for each traffic report
• Frequency: One traffic report every 10 minutes
Upon receiving such information, the MCP computes
Alice’s estimated time of arrival (ETA) and routing infor-
mation by using GraphHopper or Google Maps APIs1. This
information is then used to infer Alice’s mobility distribu-
tion and run the auction mechanism (as explained in Section
3). This process will decide whether Alice will be selected
and how much she will be rewarded. If selected, the MCP
1. Grasshopper available at https://graphhopper.com/ and Google
Maps API at https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/
directions/intro
replies with the following message, which is displayed on
the sensing app screen:
• Name: Alice Jones
• Unique ID: 1242760243
• Reward: $0.27 for each traffic report
Alice may then submit every 10 minutes a traffic report
during her trip to 345 E 57th Street. Depending on the
number of reports, the MCP then pays Alice accordingly.
For example, if she submitted 6 reports, Alice will be paid
6 × 0.27 = $1.62. Note here that Alice received a higher
reward per report than what she asked for. This is possible,
as explained in Section 3.
Important Remarks. We point out that the bidding pro-
cess is handled automatically by the app, and is transparent
to the participant (i.e., does not require any interaction).
This aspect makes IncentMe easily embeddable in existing
navigation apps.
TABLE 1: Summary of main symbols.
Symbol Description
S set of sectors
Q set of participants
Z set of sensing tasks
T set of winning bidders
B set of bidders
R vector of rewards
α auction’s allocation function
pi auction’s payment function
B auction’s budget
τi,j sensing task for sector i at time tj
Vij value of sensing task τi,j
W (i, j, T ) prob. at least one participant is in sector i at tj
V(T ) total value obtained by the auction
pi,jk mobility distribution of k-th participant
γk cost of k-th participant to execute a sensing task
νk bid submitted by k-th participant
uk(νk) utility obtained by the k-th participant by bidding νk
2.1 Definitions
Let us now formalize the IncentMe system described above.
Table 1 summarizes the main symbols used throughout the
paper. To model participants’ mobility, the sensing area is
divided into sectors, which represent the sensing granularity
of the application. For example, in a traffic monitoring ap-
plication, the sectors can be as large as a city block, whereas
in air quality monitoring applications the sector can be as
large as a neighborhood. Time is discretized, with j being
the j-th time slot between tj and tj+T .
Let S define the set of s = |S| sectors forming the sensing
area. Let Q be the set of m = |Q| participants competing for
offering their sensing services. We define sensing task as a
sensing activity that the MCP needs to be performed in a
particular place and at a particular time. More formally:
Definition 1. (Sensing task). A sensing task is a tuple τi,j =
(i, j) where i ∈ S indicates the sector and j ∈ R+ indicates the
timestep (e.g., τ3,4 indicates the sensing task involving sector 3 at
timestep 4). We let Z indicate the set of sensing tasks.
Mobility Assumptions and Remarks. We realistically
assume that participants can leave and enter the system at
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their will. For simplicity, we define t = 0 as the moment
in which the auction is executed. To model participants’
mobility, let pi,jk indicate the probability that the k-th par-
ticipant will be in sector i at time j. To derive proofs that
are independent from a given participants’ mobility pattern,
our incentive mechanisms will be derived by considering
generic pi,jk values. As described in the use case in Section
3.1, participants’ mobility information can be acquired (with
some degree of uncertainty) by using APIs such as Google
Maps or GrassHopper. Note that we are not assuming
that participants’ mobility is perfectly known. Furthermore,
given the large number of participants to real-world mobile
crowdsensing systems, we assume that the number of par-
ticipants that could team up to manipulate the auction result
is not significant w.r.t. the total number of participants; this
assumption has also been made in existing related work [7].
We now formally define some terms that will be fre-
quently utilized in this paper.
Definition 2. (Mechanism) [11]. Let B be the set of bidders,
T be the set of winning bidders, and R be the vector of rewards
given to the auction participants. A mechanismM defines a tuple
{α, pi}, where α : B → T is defined as the auction’s allocation
function, and pi : T → R is the auction’s payment function.
As regards to the bidding process, we know partici-
pants spend resources when performing sensing services,
for example, personal time, device battery, and network
bandwidth. We denote γk as the cost of the k-th participant
for executing a sensing task, which includes the minimum
profit that the participant desires to earn by participating.
We consider γk as personal information and thus not re-
vealed to the MCP. We also define νk as the bid submitted
by participant k. We point out that in general, νk 6= γk (i.e.,
the bid may be different from the cost).
Definition 3. (Utility) [11]. The utility obtained by the k-th
auction participant by bidding νk and receiving as reward R(k)
is the quantity uk(νk) = R(k)−γk, where γk is the cost incurred
by k when executing one sensing task.
In the equation above, the rewardR(k) assigned to each
winning bidder k ∈ T depends on the bid νk through the
auction’s payment function pi : T → R. This implies that
the utility uk also depends on νk, hence its appearance on
the left side of the equation.
Since participants are selfish and interested in maximiz-
ing their own utility, they may try to overbid (i.e., submitting
νk much higher than γk), trying to achieve a higher reward.
This may ultimately compromise the auction’s efficiency
[11]. To solve this problem, we need to design truthful
mechanisms that align the participants’ interests with the
system goals. A mechanism is truthful if any user maximizes
her utility by bidding her real cost γk, no matter how other
participants may act; we also require our mechanisms to
satisfy individual rationality, which means that any user al-
ways gets a non-negative utility, and to be computationally
efficient. These properties are formally defined below.
Definition 4. (Truthfulness) [11]. The mechanism M =
{α, pi} is truthful iff uk(γk) ≥ uk(x), for any x 6= γk.
Definition 5. (Individual rationality) [11]. A mechanism is
individual-rational iff uk(x) ≥ 0, ∀k.
Definition 6. (Computational efficiency) [11]. A mechanism
is computationally efficient iff α and pi have at most polynomial
complexity in the number of bids.
Definition 6 is a standard definition: our mechanisms are
indeed low-order polynomial and are scalable (i.e., they can
be parallelized).
3 MECHANISM DESIGN
Figure 3 summarizes the flow of Section 3. First, the Bud-
geted Value Maximization (BVM) problem is introduced,
then we show it is NP-Hard. Next, to provide mechanisms
with approximate solutions, we demonstrate that BVM’s
value function is submodular. We then propose Truthful
Value Maximization (TVM) mechanism to efficiently solve
the BVM, and prove that it is truthful, individual-rational,
budget-feasible, and achieves an approximation ratio with
the optimum solution. To further improve over TVM, we
propose Heuristic Value Maximization (HVM), a mecha-
nism that leverages interpolation search [19] to provide a
more efficient solution to the BVM.
NP-HARDNESS
OF BVM
BVM
PROBLEM
SUBMODULARITY 
OF BVM VALUE
FUNCTION
GREEDY ALGORITHM
(TVM)
PROOFS OF
THEORETICAL
PROPERTIES
HEURISTIC 
ALGORITHM
(HVM)
Fig. 3: Summary of Section 3.
3.1 Budgeted Value Maximization
We are now ready to formulate the user incentivization
problem studied in this paper. Let us define Vij as the
value that sensing task τij has for the MCP. Intuitively, Vij
models the preference that the system has for some sensing
tasks instead of others (e.g., covering some neighborhoods
of a city may be more important than covering others). For
notational simplicity, Vij = 0 if τij 6∈ Z , the set of sensing
tasks.
Problem 1. Budgeted Value Maximization (in short, BVM).
Let W (i, j, T ) = 1−∏k∈T (1− pi,jk ) be the probability that at
least one participant will be in sector i at time j, which is also the
probability that at least one participant will be able to execute the
sensing task. Finally, let us define B as the available budget, z as
the maximum timestamp of the available sensing tasks, hereafter
referred to as auction duration, and s as the number of sectors.
Given values Vij and function W (i, j, T ), let V(T ) be defined as
V(T ) ,
s∑
i=1
z∑
j=1
Vij ·W (i, j, T ) (1)
Find set of bidders T ∗ and reward vector R∗ such as
T ∗ = arg max
T ⊆B
s∑
i=1
z∑
j=1
Vij ·W (i, j, T ),
∑
r∈R∗
r ≤ B
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The optimization function defined in BVM can be seen as
a function expressing the probability that the sensing tasks
will be executed (each one weighted with its value).
Before introducing the novel mechanisms developed in
this paper, we first demonstrate that BVM is NP-Hard.
Theorem 1. BVM is NP-Hard.
Proof. In order to prove the NP-Hardness of BVM, we pro-
vide a reduction from the well-known Bounded Knapsack
problem (BKP). A general BKP instance has a capacity B
and a set of items Ω = {s1 · · · sn}, where each item si ∈ Ω
has a value vi and a weight wi. The goal of BKP is to find
a set S∗ ⊆ Ω whose items provide maximum value and do
not exceed the capacity B of the knapsack. We translate the
general BKP instance into a simpler instance of BVM, where
we consider a single time step (i.e., z = 1). We also assume
that each bidder is in a different sector of the sensing area,
the probability of being in that sector is equal to one, and
that the payment function is such as ρk = νk. By defining
Xk an indicator function that is equal to one if a bidder is
in sector k, and zero otherwise, a solution to BVM can be
translated into a solution of the BKP instance by setting the
value vk of each knapsack item to Vk1 ·Xk, its weight wk to
νk, and B as the size of the knapsack. As a result, solving
BVM is at least as hard as solving BKP, therefore BVM is
NP-Hard.
3.2 Submodularity of BVM
We now prove that the objective function of BVM (defined
in Equation 1) belongs to the family of submodular functions
[20]. Let us now define submodularity, and prove some
properties necessary to design a greedy algorithm with
proven approximation ratio.
Definition 7. (Submodularity) [20]. Given ground set S and a
function F : 2S → R+, then ∀A ⊆ B ⊆ S, F is submodular iff,
for any i ∈ S, F(A ∪ {i})−F(A) ≥ F(B ∪ {i})−F(B).
Theorem 2. The function V(T ), defined in Equation (1) is (i)
submodular, (ii) non-decreasing, and (iii) V(∅) = 0.
Proof. Let us define ∆X,k , V(X ∪ {k}) − V(X) as the
increment in value to V given by the addition to X of a
generic element k, hereafter referred to as marginal value
of k given X . In order to prove (i), we need to show that,
for sets A ⊆ B ⊆ S, it is true that ∆A,k ≥ ∆B,k.
∆X,k =
s∑
i=1
z∑
j=1
Vij ·
1− ∏
y∈X∪{k}
(1− pi,jy )
−
s∑
i=1
z∑
j=1
Vij ·
1− ∏
y∈X
(1− pi,jy )

=
s∑
i=1
z∑
j=1
Vij ·
1− (1− pi,jk ) ∏
y∈X
(1− pi,jy )
−
s∑
i=1
z∑
j=1
Vij ·
1− ∏
y∈X
(1− pi,jy )

=
s∑
i=1
z∑
j=1
Vij · pi,jk︸ ︷︷ ︸
·
∏
y∈X
(1− pi,jy )
The braced section in ∆X,k does not depend on X . Thus,
it is only needed to prove that
∏
y∈A (1−pi,jy ) ≥
∏
y∈B (1−
pi,jy ) holds for any A ⊆ B.
∏
y∈A
(1− pi,jy )︸ ︷︷ ︸
, Z
≥
∏
y∈B
(1− pi,jy ) ,
Z ≥ Z ·
∏
y∈{B−A}
(1− pi,jy ) ,
1 ≥
∏
y∈{B−A}
(1− pi,jy )
Since pi,jy is a probability, the inequality above holds. This
proves property (i).
Furthermore, property (ii) can be derived straightfor-
wardly from the fact that W (i, j, T ∪ {i}) ≥ W (i, j, T ) ∀T ,
and property (iii) follows from W (i, j, ∅) = 0, by definition
of empty product.
3.3 Truthful Value Maximization
Solving the BVM while guaranteeing truthfulness and
budget-feasibility is extremely challenging. For this reason,
we propose Truthful Value Maximization (TVM), which is a
mechanism that adopts recent advances in the field of sub-
modular function maximization [20] to provide a solution to
the BVM with proven approximation ratio through a greedy
strategy.
Algorithm 1 TVM allocation function
Input: B, B, Q, V
Output: T , Tv
1: T = ∅
2: Tv = ∅
3: Tc = Q
4: while Tc 6= ∅ do
5:
k∗ = arg max
k∈Tc
∆T ,k/νk
6: if νk∗ +
∑
k∈T νk ≤ B then
7: if νk∗ ≤ B2 ·
∆T ,k∗
∆T ,k∗+
∑
v∈Tv ∆T ,v
then
8: Append k∗ to T
9: Append ∆T ,k∗ to Tv
10: end if
11: end if
12: Tc = Tc − {k∗}
13: end while
14: return T ,Tv
Algorithm 1 presents the allocation function of TVM.
It incrementally constructs a set of winners T , initially
empty (line 1). At each iteration, the algorithm picks an
unconsidered bidder k∗ having maximum weight, where
the weight is defined as the increase in the function V that
k∗ provides, divided by its bid (line 5). The bidder k∗ is
included in T only if the current sum of bidding values is
not exceeded (line 6) and if a condition regarding the new
bid νk is satisfied (line 7). In Theorem 6, we demonstrate that
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Algorithm 2 TVM payment function
Input: T , B, B, Q, V
Output: R
1: for every i ∈ T do
2: Bi = B − {νi},Qi = Q− {i}
3: T i,T iv = Algorithm-1(B,Bi,Qi,V)
4: X = ∅
5: for every j = 1 . . . |T i| do
6: νij =
∆X ,i×νj
∆X ,j
7: ρij =
B
2 · ∆X ,i∑j′≤j T iv (j)+∆X ,i
8: Append T i(j) to X
9: end for
10: end for
11: return R(i) = maxj {min{ρij , νij}} ,∀i ∈ T
the stopping criterion in line 7 ensures budget-feasibility
of the mechanism and a constant approximation ratio with
respect to the optimum solution of BVM. The algorithm
returns the set T of winning bidders.
The payment scheme of TVM, as described in Algorithm
2, assigns to each winning bidder a payment corresponding
to the critical value, which provably ensures truthfulness of
the mechanism [10]. We point out that the critical value of
a bidder is the maximum value that bidder could have bid
and still win the auction. Unfortunately, the critical value
computation is complicated by the submodularity of the
marginal contributions ∆T ,k, which implies that the value
depends on the order by which participants are selected in
the allocation function of TVM. To compute payments in an
efficient way, for each bidder i, we consider the maximum
of all possible bids that i could have declared and still get
allocated, as explained next. Consider running the allocation
function without i. Let us consider the first j participants
with highest marginal value. By using the marginal contri-
bution of i at point j, we can find the maximal cost that
agent i can declare in order to be allocated instead of the
agent in the j-th place in the sorting. Therefore, paying the
user the maximum over all the possible j positions ensures
that i is paid the critical value.
Example. For simplicity, we consider a sensing area com-
posed of four sectors and a time range of only 1 timestep,
so z = 1. Let us consider the case in which three bidders
are competing to offer their sensing services. The value
of each sector is V = {.3, .2, .1, .4}, while the mobility
distributions of the bidders at timestep 1 are as follows:
p11 = {.2, .1, .3, .4}, p12 = {0, .8, .05, .15}, p13 = {.4, .2, 0, .4}.
The bids submitted are B = {10, 8, 12}.
Allocation function
Input: B = 20, B = {10, 8, 12}
• Step 1: T = {}, Tv = {}
∆T ,1
ν1
= 0.2·0.3+0.1·0.2+0.3·0.1+0.4·0.410 = 0.027
∆T ,2
ν2
= 0·0.3+0.8·0.2+0.05·0.1+0.15·0.48 = 0.028
∆T ,3
ν3
= 0.4·0.3+0.2·0.2+0·0.1+0.4·0.412 = 0.0277
Is 8 ≤ 202 · 0.281250.28125 ? YES
Append k∗ = 2 to T
Append ∆T ,k∗ = 0.225 to Tv
• Step 2: T = {2}, Tv = {0.225}
∆T ,1
ν1
= 0.228510 = 0.02285
∆T ,3
ν3
= 0.264012 = 0.022
Is 10 ≤ 202 · 0.022850.02285+0.225 ? NO
Condition on budget (line 7) is not fulfilled. Al-
gorithm 1 terminates, and returns T = {2} and
Tv = {0.225}
Payment function
Input: T = {2}
• Step 1: i = 2
Run auction without 2 (lines 2-3)
– Step 1-A: j = 1
ν21 = 0.225 · 10/0.27 = 8.33
ρ21 = 10
To win against 1, user 2 has to bid 8.33.
Return R(2) = max
j ∈ {1} {min{ρ2j , ν2j}} = 8.33
3.4 Proof of Theoretical Properties
We now prove that TVM is truthful, individual-rational, and
budget-feasible.
Theorem 3. TVM is truthful.
Proof. In order to characterize the truthfulness of the mech-
anism, we apply the characterization of Myerson [10]. A
mechanism is truthful iff (i) the allocation function is mono-
tone: if bidder k wins the auction by bidding νk, it also wins
by bidding ν′k < νk; (ii) Each winner is paid the critical
value: bidder k would not win the auction if it bids higher
than the critical value.
(Monotonicity). The first property is guaranteed by the
greediness of the algorithm. By lowering her bid, any allo-
cated bidder would only increase her marginal value per
unit cost and thus be placed ahead in the sorting order
considered by the allocation function.
(Critical value). According to Algorithm 2, each winning
bidder i is rewarded maxj {min{ρij , νij}}. Let us consider
r to be the index for which Pi = min{ρir, νir}. Therefore,
bidding Pi implies that i would be allocated at position r in
the run of the algorithm without i. Four different cases are
thus possible.
1) νir ≤ ρir and νir = maxj νij . Reporting a bid higher
than νir places bidder i after the first unallocated
user k∗ in the alternate run of the mechanism, thus
i would not be selected.
2) νir ≤ ρir and νir < maxj νij . Consider some j for
which νir < νij . Since r has maximality condition,
it must be the case that ρij ≤ νir ≤ νij . Therefore,
bidding higher than νir would violate the selection
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condition (line 7, Algorithm 1) and hence i would
not be allocated. For some other j such as νir ≥ νij ,
bidding higher than νir would place i after j, so i
would not be allocated at position j.
3) νir ≥ ρir and ρir = maxj νij . Reporting a bid
higher than ρir violates the selection condition at
each of the indices in j ∈ T i, hence i would not be
selected.
4) νir ≥ ρir and ρir < maxj νij . Consider some j for
which ρir < ρij . Since r has maximality condition, it
must be the case that νij ≤ ρir ≤ ρij . Therefore, bid-
ding higher than ρir would put i after j and hence
i would not be allocated. For j such as ρir ≥ ρij ,
bidding higher than νir would mean i would not be
allocated at considered position j.
In all four cases, bidding higher than Pi would cause bidder
i to not be selected, thus Pi is the critical value.
Theorem 4. TVM is individual-rational.
Proof. Consider the bid that i can declare to be allocated
at position j = i (i.e., back at its original position) in the
alternate run of the mechanism. Therefore, the payment that
i will receive will be Pi = min{ρii, νii}, We prove that νi ≤
Pi. First, we show that νii ≥ νi:
νii =
∆X ,i · νi
∆X ,j
≥ ∆X ,i · νi
∆X ,i
= νi
The equality holds because νj/∆T ,j ≥ νi/∆T ,i since i was
selected after i − 1 in the selection algorithm instead of j.
Next, we show that ρii ≥ νi:
ρij =
B
2
· ∆X ,i∑
j′≤i−1 T iv (j′) + ∆X ,i
=
B
2
· ∆X ,i∑
j≤i−1 ∆X ,j + ∆X ,i
≥ νi
(2)
The second equality holds from the fact that the first i − 1
allocated elements in both the runs of the mechanism are
the same. The third inequality follows from the proportional
share criteria used to decide the allocation of i after i − 1
participants were selected already.
We provide sketches of Theorems 5 and 6 due to space
limitations.
Theorem 5. TVM is budget-feasible.
Proof. (Sketch.) It is first proven that the maximum payment
for a user p is 2 · ∆p/∑k∈T ∆k · B, where ∆p is the marginal
contribution given by p computed during the run of the al-
location function. Thus,
∑
i∈T R(i) ≤
∑
i∈T 2 ·∆p/∑k∈T∆k ·
B/2 ≤ B.
An approximation algorithm A is said to have an ap-
proximation ratio (or factor) ρ if for each input x the value
f(x) of the approximate solution A(x) will not be less than
ρ times the optimal value OPT. More formally, for algorithm
A it holds that
ρ ·OPT ≤ f(x) ≤ OPT ∀x. (3)
In other words, the approximation ratio is a measure of the
performance of an approximation algorithm, since it shows
the worst-case performance of the algorithm.
Theorem 6. TVM achieves an approximation ratio of (e− 1/3e)−
λ ∼ 0.2107 − λ, where λ is the ratio of the participants’ largest
marginal contribution and the optimum.
Proof. (Sketch.) It is proven that TVM achieves a utility that
is at least 1/3 of the well-known greedy algorithm proposed
in [21], which in turn achieves an approximation ratio of
e− 1/e− λ.
For example, if each participant can contribute at most
1% to the optimal utility (i.e., λ = 0.01), Theorem 6 guaran-
tees a constant approximation factor of 0.2007.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 1 has complexity Θ(m2 · s · z), where
m is the number of bidders, s is the number of sectors, and z
is the auction allocation span, while Algorithm 2 has complexity
O(m3 · s · z).
Proof. The complexity of Algorithm 1 is dominated by the
complexity of the while loop (line 4 through 15). At each
iteration, the loop computes the quantities ∆T ,k for each k ∈
Tc. As every iteration of loop removes one element from Tc,
this implies that this computation is performed m+m−1+
m−2+· · ·+1 = Θ(m2) times. The complexity of computing
∆T ,k for a generic k is dominated by the computation of
V(T ∪ {k}) =
s∑
i=1
z∑
j=1
Vij ·W (i, j, T ∪ {k}) (4)
We now provide a way to recursively derive in constant
time W (i, j, T ∪{k}) as a function of W (i, j, T ). The overall
complexity of computing V(T ∪ {k}) will be therefore Θ(s ·
z), which yields a total algorithm complexity of Θ(m2 ·s ·z).
W (i, j, T ∪ {k}) = 1−
∏
q∈T ∪{k}
(1− pi,jq )
= 1− (1− pi,jk ) ·
1−W (i,j,T )︷ ︸︸ ︷∏
q∈T
(1− pi,jq )
= 1− (1− pi,jk ) · (1−W (i, j, T ))
(5)
where W (i, j, ∅) = 0 by definition. Since the algorithm
might terminate before having evaluated every bidder (line
7), the complexity becomes O(m2 · s · z). The complexity of
Algorithm 2 can be calculated by observing that there are
at most m iterations of the main loop (line 1), and in each
loop the complexity is dominated by the execution of the
selection function (line 3). This yields a total complexity of
O(m3 · s · z).
3.5 Heuristic Value Maximization
Although TVM achieves a provable approximation bound,
the stopping criterion of TVM allocation algorithm (line 7,
Algorithm 1) limits the efficiency of TVM, as a significant
part of the budget will be left unutilized during the run of
the payment function. In order to optimize TVM without
sacrificing to efficiency, the monotonicity of the sum of
payments can be leveraged. We now illustrate this point
through an example.
Example. In the following, we will refer as actual bud-
get (B) the budget available for the current auction, and
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Fig. 4: TVM: sum of payments vs. input budget.
by input budget (Bˆ) the budget that is given as input to
the TVM selection algorithm (line 1, Algorithm 1). Figure
4 depicts the sum of payments assigned to winning bidders
by TVM as a function of the input budget value Bˆ, where we
consider 1000 bidders and truncated normal bid distribution
(with mean=0.5 and support=1). As we can see from this
plot, the sum of payments allocated to the winning bidders
remains significantly below the actual budget. For example,
assuming actual budget B equal to 10, the optimal input
budget value B∗ that yields sum of payments equal to 10
would be 31. Furthermore, Bˆ equal to 10 yields sum of
payments equal to 2, which means that 80% of the allocated
budget remains not utilized by TVM.
From this example, it emerges that the performance
of TVM can be further optimized by exploring the input
budget space and finding the Bˆ value yielding the highest
sum of payments that remains below the actual budget. To
explain our approach, let us assume to have an “array”
of n elements in which we store the sum of payments
corresponding to all the input budgets from B to B+n− 1.
Since payments are monotone with the budget, the array
will be sorted. Thus, finding the optimum input budget
corresponds to finding the rightmost place where the given
sum of payments can be correctly inserted in the array
without compromising the sorted order. However, given the
values of the “array” are unknown in advance, we want to
reduce as much as possible the number of guesses, since
each guess implies running the TVM auction with given
input budget.
Algorithm 3 introduces Heuristic Value Maximization
(HVM), which uses interpolation and exponential searches
[19] to find the optimum input budget by computing no
more than O(log log n)2 times the TVM auction. HVM is
mainly made up by two procedures:
• First, it finds the lower and upper bound Bmin and
Bmax of the search interval by using exponential
search, which doubles the search interval until the
sum of payments is below the actual budget (line 2).
This guarantees that the search interval will be found
in O(logB∗) runs of TVM auction.
• Then, it calculates the next point Bcur by cal-
culating the line passing between the two points
2. Bound valid under the assumption of uniformly distributed sum
of payments [19].
Algorithm 3 Heuristic Value Maximization
Input: B, B, Q, V
Output: B∗
1: Bmin = B, Bmax = B + 1
2: Bmin, Bmax,Rmin,Rmax = FMMB(B,B,Q,V)
3: while Bmin ≤ Bmax do
4: Bcur = INT(Bmin, Bmax,Rmin,Rmax)
5: Tcur = Algorithm-1(Bcur,B,Q,V)
6: Rcur = Algorithm-2(T , Bcur,B,Q,V)
7: if
∑
k∈Tcur Rcur(k) > B then
8: Bmax = Bcur − 1
9: Rmax = Rcur
10: else
11: Bmin = Bcur + 1
12: Rmin = Rcur
13: end if
14: end while
15: Return Bmin
(Bmin, Rmin) and (Bmax, Rmax) and computing the
next step Bcur as the x component of the point
passing by the actual budget B. If the payment Rcur
yielded by the new point Bcur is greater than (resp.
less than or equal to) the budget, the algorithm ex-
plores the left (resp. right) part of the search interval,
which is [Bmin, Bcur − 1] (resp. [Bcur + 1, Bmax])
until the exit condition is met (line 4). In order to
further speed up the execution time, the algorithm
approximates the Rmax and Rmin values with the
Rcur value (lines 9 and 12).
Example. Figure 5 shows a run of the exponential search
used to find the search interval of HVM. In this example,
the actual budget is B = 15, whereas the optimum is the
input budget B∗ = 114, corresponding to a sum of payment
P ∗ = 15. By starting from Bˆ0 = 15 (same as actual budget),
the interval is doubled until the sum of payment is greater
than the actual budget, which is Bˆ3 = 120. The lower bound
of the search interval will be Bˆ2 = 60. Thus, the starting
interval is [Bˆ2, Bˆ3] = [60, 120].
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Fig. 5: Example of Exponential search.
Figure 6 shows the execution of one step of interpolation
search; we also consider one step performed by binary
search for comparison. The next point selected by binary
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search will be Bˆcur = Bˆ2 + Bˆ3 − Bˆ2/2 = 90, which is the
mid point of the interval. As far as interpolation search is
concerned, the goal is to compute the intersection between
the segment (Bˆ2, Pˆ2) – (Bˆ3, Pˆ3) with the line B = 15. To
this end, the slope of the segment is computed as ∆ =
(Bˆ3 − Bˆ2)/(Pˆ3 − Pˆ2) = 8.37. Then, the next point is computed
as Bˆcur = Bˆ2 + B − Pˆ2/∆ = 60 + (15 − 8.945) · 8.37 = 110.
As we can see, the computation of the next point provided
by interpolation search is closer to the optimum value than
the one provided by binary search.
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Fig. 6: Example of Interpolation search.
To conclude this section, we point out that the bounds
and theoretical properties of HVM are the same to those
of TVM, since HVM uses the same allocation and payment
functions of TVM. Therefore, the result provided by HVM
cannot be worse than TVM. We omit the formal proofs due
to space limitations.
3.6 Parallel Implementation
Given the large number of participants in mobile crowd-
sensing applications, it is imperative to design incentive
mechanisms that are able to handle the bidding of partic-
ipants at scale. Thus, the objective is to adapt Algorithms 1
and 2 (i.e., selection and payment functions) to a parallel
version, to handle a large number of bids from the par-
ticipants. To this end, we notice that the main bottleneck
of Algorithm 1 is line 5, which is the computation of the
maximum value of ∆T ,k values, for every participant k.
However, each of these quantities can be computed sepa-
rately by different jobs, and the result reduced to obtain the
maximum. Regarding the payment function (Algorithm 2),
we notice that the computation of the payment for each
winning bidder (line 1) can be assigned to a different job.
The same can be applied to compute line 5. In Section
4, we show the performance evaluation of HVM when
implemented with parallel jobs.
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we present the results obtained by evaluating
the performance of HVM and TVM and the comparison of
their performance with existing relevant work.
4.1 Experimental Setup
In order to obtain real-world participants’ mobility and
evaluate the performance with different mobility patterns,
we have considered real mobility traces collected from the
following datasets:
• CRAWDAD-SanFrancisco [14]: This dataset contains
mobility traces of approximately 500 taxis in San
Francisco, USA, collected over one month’s time;
• CRAWDAD-Rome [15]: In this dataset, 320 taxi
drivers in the center of Rome were monitored during
March 2014;
• MSR-Beijing [16]: This dataset collected by Microsoft
Research Asia contains the GPS positions of 10,357
taxis in Beijing during one month.
The heatmaps of the three datasets are shown in Figure 7,
where warmer colors indicate the most popular places. As
we can see, the mobility is more concentrated in Rome and
Beijing, whereas it is more uniform in San Francisco.
The evaluation of the proposed mechanisms has been
performed by emulating an application where taxi cab
drivers report vehicular traffic events; its use case has been
discussed in details in Section 2.1. In details, we consider
the sensing area to be approximately 4×4km square areas,
a timestep of 5 minutes, and the sensing areas divided into
400 sectors, such that each sector is approximately as large
as a city block and the timestep is coherent to the granularity
required by traffic monitoring applications.
To emulate bidders’ behavior, inspired by existing work
[22], we assume that (i) the duration of each taxi trip follows
a Poisson probability distribution having average λd = 6
timesteps; and (ii) the time between each bid (i.e., the bid-
ding frequency) follows a Poisson probability distribution
having average λb = 3 timesteps. The trip start and end
locations, as well as the path followed by the taxis, are taken
from the mobility traces. The MCP generates the sensing
tasks in such a way that each sector of the sensing area must
be covered during each timestep.
For the distribution of the bidding quantities, we were
also inspired by previous work [22] and considered Gaus-
sian distributed costs with mean 0.5 and standard deviation
of 0.15. In all experiments, we considered 100 bidders, if
not stated otherwise. In each experiment, we performed 100
repetitions and computed 95% confidence intervals, which
are not shown if below 1%. As far as the weight of each
sector, we have obtained the weight values by computing
the sectors that are were most popular from the traces. For
example, assuming that the sensing area had three sectors,
if they were visited 10%, 50%, and 40%, respectively, the
weights would have been set to 0.1, 0.5, and 0.4.
The experiments were performed on a cloud comput-
ing system emulated by two Dell Precision T7610 servers,
equipped with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2680 v2 pro-
cessor (20 cores, 2.80GHz, 64GB RAM), and by four Dell
Optiplex(R) 7010 with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3770 CPU (7
cores, 3.40GHz, 8GB RAM).
4.2 Comparison with Existing Work
For comparison reasons, we implemented the auctions due
to Singer (IEEE FOCS 2010 [12]), Chen et al. (ACM SODA
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Fig. 7: Heatmaps of the mobility traces contained in the datasets.
2011 [13]). To the best of our knowledge, Singer and Chen
are considered the most relevant work in the field of truthful
incentive mechanisms with budget constraints. To compare
HVM and TVM with budget-unconstrained approaches, we
also implemented the IMCU auction (IEEE/ACM TNET
2016 [18]) and and the auction proposed by Hu et al.
(IEEE/ACM IWQoS 2016 [17]), which is also tailored to ad-
dress incentivization in vehicle-based mobile crowdsensing.
Similarly to us, Singer and Chen also use the theory
of budgeted maximization of submodular functions, by
providing randomized auction mechanisms with proven
expected approximation ratio. However, as seen in Table 2,
TVM and HVM outperform them by achieving an approx-
imation factor that is 1.67x and 23.51x higher than Chen
and Singer, respectively. This is because we do not use
a randomized approach but instead we select participants
based on their marginal values and make sure the total
payment will be below the budget. On the other hand, Yang
and Hu take a different approach and use the bid values
as stopping condition of the selection function. Although
this makes the algorithms simpler, Yang and Hu suffer of
decreased performance, as seen in Section 4.3. Also, no
maximum budget and no approximation bound is provided.
TABLE 2: Comparison of Approximation factors,
TVM/HVM vs. Prior Work.
Auction Approximation Factor
Singer [12] (e−1)
2
(58e2−32e+6) ≈ 0.008929
Chen [13] 5·e
e−1 ≈ 0.1264
Our work (HVM/TVM) 3·e
e−1 ≈ 0.2107
4.3 Experimental Results
In the following, we will use the Obtained Value (OV)
and the percentage of obtained value (POV) to evaluate the
performance of the auctions. The POV is defined as the
success probability of the weighted sensing task obtained
by the auction mechanism (see BVM problem, Equation 1)
divided by the maximum obtainable value given by the
optimum solution. More formally, if P ∗ is the optimum,
then POV = OV/P∗. Intuitively, the POV describes how
efficient the mechanism is in recruiting participants, while
the OV express the performance of each algorithm as ab-
solute value. We will also use the speed-up to evaluate the
scalability of HVM. Specifically, given execution time E1
and E2, the speed-up is defined as E1/E2. Since in this
paper we are only considering the problem of effective and
efficient recruiting of participants in mobile crowdsensing,
we believe these metrics are sufficient and appropriate to
evaluate and compare the performance of the mechanisms.
Efficiency of TVM and HVM. Figures 8 and 9 show
the average POV and OV experimented by the considered
mechanisms, as a function of the allocated budget per
timestep. From the plots we can derive the following conclu-
sions. First, HVM performs better than the other auctions,
since HVM is significantly budget-effective as it uses almost
all the available budget at each execution of the algorithm,
while at the same time guaranteeing budget-feasibility. Sec-
ond, TVM increases its performance significantly as the
available budget increases, which is expected as the auction
will terminate after selecting more participants. Third, the
performance of existing auctions remains always below
70%, irrespective of the available budget. Moreover, the
performance of Yang and Hu remains almost constant as it
considers only the participants’ bids and not the budget in
the selection process. On the average, HVM increases the
POV by a remarkable 33.2%, which is average of 31.5%,
36.3.%, and 31.9%. We also observe that the auctions obtain
higher POV when the mobility is less dispersed (Rome and
Beijing). Intuitively, this is because the sensing tasks that can
be potentially executed are less, therefore it is more likely
that participants will be able to execute them.
Impact of Participants’ Mobility on Performance. As
anticipated earlier, factoring participants’ mobility into the
user selection process is fundamental to obtain high per-
formance of the incentive mechanism. To demonstrate this
point, we show the POV and OV as a function of the prob-
ability that a bidder will not be able to execute the sensing
task after been assigned to it, defined for simplicity as task
failure probability (TFP). Note that this probability models
effectively the case of uncertain mobility, as the effect of
not being at a particular sector at a given moment in time
(because the mobility has changed) implies that the assigned
task will fail to be executed. As expected, Figures 10 and
11 show that the overall performance of all the algorithms
decreases as the TFP increases. On the other hand, we point
out that HVM is more resilient than the other algorithms,
as the increased efficiency in budget utilization allows to
select more bidders and in turn allows more redundancy
in the selection process (i.e., hire more participants). On the
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Fig. 8: POV vs. Allocated Budget per Timestep.
TABLE 3: Improvement of HVM vs Binary Search.
Bidders # Binary Search HVM
100 1.000 0.598
200 3.356 1.923
300 6.602 3.629
400 9.884 5.677
500 13.898 7.801
600 17.561 9.82
700 21.791 12.227
800 26.828 16.000
900 33.631 18.934
1000 36.660 21.012
average, HVM achieves 25.6% more POV (average of 24.8%,
27.5%, and 24.6%), which makes it ideal in cases when the
TFP is high as it utilizes the allocated budget efficiently.
Impact of Parallelization on Performance. Scalability
is a fundamental asset of incentive mechanisms designed
for mobile crowdsourcing contests. To this end, in order to
demonstrate the scalability of HVM, Figure 12 shows the
computation time as a function of the number of bidders
and the number of jobs used in the parallel version of HVM.
For clarity, we normalized the execution times by the same
factor, so as to have one computation unit in the case the
number of bidders is 200 and only 1 job is used. Figure
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Fig. 9: Obtained Value vs. Allocated Budget per Timestep.
12 concludes that the speedup provided by the additional
jobs is linear; on the average, HVM gets a 12.28x speedup
by passing from 1 to 20 parallel jobs. Furthermore, HVM
significantly improves performance without sacrificing op-
timization accuracy. To show this point, Table 3 reports the
comparison between the execution time of HVM and simple
binary search. In these experiments, we assumed a budget
of 50 units. The results shown in Table 3 conclude that HVM
achieves an average speed-up in computation performance
of 43% with respect to simple binary search.
5 RELATED WORK
Significant research efforts have been dedicated to investi-
gate the incentivization issue in the broader area of crowd-
sourcing, which is defined as the process of obtaining needed
services, ideas, or content by soliciting contributions from a
large group of people, and especially from an online com-
munity, rather than from traditional employees or suppliers.
Zhang and van der Schaar proposed in [23] reputation-
based incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing, where par-
ticipants will earn reputations upon the completion of a
task. Kamar and Horvitz designed incentive mechanisms
for consensus tasks that have correct answers to incentivize
users for reporting true information [24]. They introduced
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Fig. 10: POV vs. Task Failure Probability.
a novel payment rule, called consensus prediction rule,
for evaluating the users’ reports in order to determine the
payments. Nath et al. focused on incentive mechanisms
design to minimize the total cost or minimize the total time
for executing the task [25]. However, they considered sybil
proofness, budget balance, contribution rationality, collapse-
proofness, but not truthfulness. In [26], Singla and Krause
presented a novel, no-regret posted price mechanism in
stochastic online settings. Using a different approach, Goel
et al. proposed in [27] a truthful mechanism, TM-Uniform,
for crowdsourcing markets with a budget constraint. They
proved that TM-Uniform is budget feasible, individually
rational, truthful, and is 3-approximate compared to the
optimum solution. However, they assumed that each user
is only allowed to work on one task. Therefore, the task
assignment process is basically a matching between tasks
and users. Incentive mechanism design was also studied
for problems more related to the networking field, such
as spectrum trading [28], and cooperative communications
[29], among others.
The design of incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd-
sensing systems is particularly challenging, and differenti-
ates from the aforementioned forms of incentive mechanism
design. Specifically, as participants move over the sensing
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Fig. 11: Obtained Value vs. Task Failure Probability.
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Fig. 12: Execution time vs. Number of bidders vs. Number
of parallel jobs.
area and submit reports through their mobile devices, the
value of their contributions for the mobile crowdsensing
system is strongly dynamic as it depends from the current
location of the participant. For example, a traffic report
submitted from a not particularly important location or
delayed by several minutes might not be of much value for
the system. The selection and reward assignment processes
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must therefore reflect this aspect, which has been neglected
in most of existing mechanisms.
In recent years, incentive mechanisms in mobile crowd-
sensing have been widely studied – for excellent surveys
on the topic, the reader may refer to [7], [8]. Among
these mechanisms, a clear distinction is made based on the
methodology being used to incentive participation. In partic-
ular, we differentiate between game-theoretical approaches,
which are grounded in mathematical models that provide
a foundation for reasoning about rational decision-making,
and mechanisms that exploit different concepts, such as
micropayments [30]. Game-theoretical approaches can be
further categorized, distinguishing between mechanisms
that exploit auction theory [31] and mechanisms that instead
use other concepts such as Stackelberg games [18].
Most of the existing incentive mechanisms for mobile
crowdsensing based on auction theory focus on either maxi-
mizing the total utility/value of the platform under a certain
constraint (e.g., budget) or minimizing the total payment of
the platform. Among the earliest works on the more general
field of budget-feasible auction mechanisms are [12] and
[13], where the authors proposed randomized mechanisms
achieving approximation factors of ≈ 0.008 and 0.1264. In
the narrower scope of mobile crowdsensing, one of the
first mechanisms was presented in [32], where Jaimes et al.
propose a mechanism that addresses the coverage problem
with budget constraints (shown to be NP-Hard) by greedily
finding a set of users that covers the greatest possible area
within a budget constraint. However, the mechanism fails
to consider truthfulness. The problem of guaranteeing a
truthful incentive mechanism was explored for the first
time in [33]. In this paper the authors propose a model
where the system announces a set of sensing tasks, each
one having a certain value to the system. Each user then
selects a subset of tasks according to its preference and bids
for each of them. The system then selects the participants
so as to maximize a submodular value function. Although
the mechanism shows important properties and achieves
good performances, it does not consider budget-feasibility,
participants’ location nor mobility pattern.
Recently, in [34], the authors consider the sensor selec-
tion problem taking the long-term user participation incen-
tive into explicit consideration. To this end, they propose a
VCG auction policy for the on-line sensor selection, which
achieves a constant competitive ratio of O(1) with the
optimal offline solution. In [35], the authors develop an
adaptive and distribute algorithm OptMPSS to maximize
phone user financial rewards accounting for their costs.
To incentivize phone users to participate they propose an
algorithm that merges stochastic Lyapunov optimization
with mechanism design theory. The authors show that the
mechanism achieves an optimal gross profit for all phone
users. Feng et al. proposed in [22] an incentive mechanism
which takes into account the location of the smartphone
users. Specifically, the tasks here are location-based, and
participants can bid only on tasks which are in the sensing
coverage of the smartphone. The main limitation of [22]
is that the sensing tasks and users’ positions are assumed
to be known in advance and static. A similar mechanism
considering dynamic tasks and users has been proposed by
the same authors in [36]. However, in both of these works,
the budget-feasibility has not been considered. A number of
frameworks aimed to recruit participants in order to max-
imize the coverage of the sensing area have been recently
proposed [37]–[42]. In [37], the authors propose a frame-
work to ensure coverage of the collected data, localization of
the participating smartphones, and overall energy efficiency
of the data collection process. Zhang et al. proposed in
[38] CrowdRecruiter, a framework that minimizes incentive
payments by selecting a small number of participants.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we have proposed IncentMe, a framework to
incentivize the participation of users with uncertain mo-
bility in mobile crowdsensing. First, we have defined the
IncentMe architectural model and formulated the Budgeted
Value Maximization (BVM) problem, and proved that it
is NP-Hard. By observing that its objective function is
submodular, we proposed two mechanisms that achieve
proven approximation ratio, as well as satisfy the desired
auction-theoretical property of truthfulness and individual-
rationality. We have evaluated our mechanisms through
experimental study and compared them with the relevant
existing work. Results have shown that our algorithms
outperform existing methods by almost 30%.
REFERENCES
[1] Cisco, “Cisco Visual Networking Index: Global Mobile Data Traffic
Forecast Update, 2015–2020 White Paper,” tech. rep., 2015.
[2] Waze, “The Waze traffic monitoring application.” http://www.
waze.com.
[3] S. Devarakonda, P. Sevusu, H. Liu, R. Liu, L. Iftode, and B. Nath,
“Real-time air quality monitoring through mobile sensing in
metropolitan areas,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGKDD In-
ternational Workshop on Urban Computing, UrbComp ’13, pp. 1–8,
ACM, 2013.
[4] R. Rana, C. T. Chou, N. Bulusu, S. Kanhere, and W. Hu, “Ear-
phone: A context-aware noise mapping using smart phones,”
Pervasive and Mobile Computing, vol. 17, pp. 1–22, 2015.
[5] CampusCrime, “Safety on your smartphone for you and your
campus.” http://www.campussafeapp.com, 2015.
[6] S. Nawaz and C. Mascolo, “Mining users’ significant driving
routes with low-power sensors,” in Proceedings of the 12th ACM
Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems, SenSys ’14,
ACM, 2014.
[7] F. Restuccia, S. K. Das, and J. Payton, “Incentive Mechanisms for
Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges,” ACM
Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN), vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 1–40,
2016.
[8] H. Gao, C. H. Liu, W. Wang, J. Zhao, Z. Song, X. Su, J. Crowcroft,
and K. K. Leung, “A Survey of Incentive Mechanisms for Partic-
ipatory Sensing,” IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, vol. 17,
pp. 918–943, Second Quarter 2015.
[9] X. Zhang, Z. Yang, W. Sun, Y. Liu, S. Tang, K. Xing, and X. Mao,
“Incentives for mobile crowd sensing: A survey,” IEEE Communi-
cations Surveys Tutorials, vol. 18, pp. 54–67, Firstquarter 2016.
[10] R. B. Myerson, “Optimal auction design,” Mathematics of operations
research, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 58–73, 1981.
[11] N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani, Algorith-
mic Game Theory, vol. 1. Cambridge University Press Cambridge,
2007.
[12] Y. Singer, “Budget feasible mechanisms,” in 2010 51st Annual IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pp. 765–774,
IEEE, 2010.
[13] N. Chen, N. Gravin, and P. Lu, “On the approximability of budget
feasible mechanisms,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-second Annual
ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, SODA ’11, pp. 685–
699, SIAM, 2011.
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, VOL. X, NO. Y, MONTH ZZZZ 14
[14] M. Piorkowski, N. Sarafijanovoc-Djukic, and M. Grossglauser,
“A parsimonious model of mobile partitioned networks with
clustering,” in Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on
COMmunication Systems and NETworkS, COMSNETS ’09, 2009.
[15] R. Amici, M. Bonola, L. Bracciale, A. Rabuffi, P. Loreti, and
G. Bianchi, “Performance assessment of an epidemic protocol
in VANET using real traces,” Procedia Computer Science, vol. 40,
pp. 92–99, 2014.
[16] J. Yuan, Y. Zheng, X. Xie, and G. Sun, “T-Drive: Enhancing driving
directions with taxi drivers’ intelligence,” IEEE Transactions on
Knowledge and Data Engineering, vol. 25, pp. 220–232, Jan 2013.
[17] C. Hu, M. Xiao, L. Huang, and G. Gao, “Truthful incentive
mechanism for vehicle-based nondeterministic crowdsensing,” in
2016 IEEE/ACM 24th International Symposium on Quality of Service
(IWQoS), pp. 1–10, June 2016.
[18] D. Yang, G. Xue, X. Fang, and J. Tang, “Incentive mechanisms
for crowdsensing: Crowdsourcing with smartphones,” IEEE/ACM
Trans. Netw., vol. 24, pp. 1732–1744, June 2016.
[19] A. Andersson and C. Mattsson, “Dynamic interpolation search in
o (log log n) time,” pp. 15–27, 1993.
[20] A. Krause and D. Golovin, “Submodular function maximization,”
Tractability: Practical Approaches to Hard Problems, vol. 3, p. 19, 2012.
[21] S. Kuller, A. Moss, and J. Naor, “The budgeted maximum coverage
problem,” Inf. Proc. Let., vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 39–45, 1999.
[22] Z. Feng, Y. Zhu, Q. Zhang, L. Ni, and A. Vasilakos, “Trac: Truthful
auction for location-aware collaborative sensing in mobile crowd-
sourcing,” in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International Conference
on Computer Communications, INFOCOM ’14, pp. 1231–1239, April
2014.
[23] Y. Zhang and M. van der Schaar, “Reputation-based incentive
protocols in crowdsourcing applications,” in Proceedings of the
2012 IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications,
INFOCOM ’12, pp. 2140–2148, March 2012.
[24] E. Kamar and E. Horvitz, “Incentives for truthful reporting in
crowdsourcing,” in Proceedings of the 11th International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3, AAMAS
’12, (Richland, SC), pp. 1329–1330, International Foundation for
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2012.
[25] S. Nath, P. Dayama, D. Garg, Y. Narahari, and J. Zou, “Mecha-
nism design for time critical and cost critical task execution via
crowdsourcing,” in Proceedings of the 8th International Conference
on Internet and Network Economics, WINE’12, (Berlin, Heidelberg),
pp. 212–226, Springer-Verlag, 2012.
[26] A. Singla and A. Krause, “Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing
tasks using regret minimization mechanisms,” in Proceedings of
the 22Nd International Conference on World Wide Web, WWW ’13,
(Republic and Canton of Geneva, Switzerland), pp. 1167–1178,
International World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee,
2013.
[27] G. Goel, A. Nikzad, and A. Singla, “Allocating tasks to workers
with matching constraints: Truthful mechanisms for crowdsourc-
ing markets,” in Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on
World Wide Web, WWW ’14 Companion, (Republic and Canton of
Geneva, Switzerland), pp. 279–280, International World Wide Web
Conferences Steering Committee, 2014.
[28] D. Yang, X. Zhang, and G. Xue, “Promise: A framework for
truthful and profit maximizing spectrum double auctions,” in
INFOCOM, 2014 Proceedings IEEE, pp. 109–117, April 2014.
[29] L. Chen, L. Libman, and J. Leneutre, “Conflicts and incentives
in wireless cooperative relaying: A distributed market pricing
framework,” Parallel and Distributed Systems, IEEE Transactions on,
vol. 22, pp. 758–772, May 2011.
[30] S. Reddy, D. Estrin, M. Hansen, and M. Srivastava, “Examining
micro-payments for participatory sensing data collections,” in
Proceedings of the 2010 ACM International Conference on Ubiquitous
Computing, Ubicomp ’10, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 33–36, ACM,
2010.
[31] V. Krishna, Auction theory. Academic press, 2009.
[32] L. G. Jaimes, I. Vergara-Laurens, and M. A. Labrador, “A location-
based incentive mechanism for participatory sensing systems with
budget constraints,” in Proceedings of the 2012 IEEE International
Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications, PerCom ’12,
pp. 103–108, March 2012.
[33] D. Yang, G. Xue, X. Fang, and J. Tang, “Crowdsourcing to smart-
phones: Incentive mechanism design for mobile phone sensing,”
in Proceedings of the 18th ACM Annual International Conference
on Mobile Computing and Networking, MobiCom ’12, pp. 173–184,
ACM, 2012.
[34] L. Gao, F. Hou, and J. Huang, “Providing long-term participatory
incentive in participatory sensing,” in Proceedings of the 2015 IEEE
International Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM
’15, pp. –, March 2015.
[35] S. Yang, U. Adeel, and J. McCann, “Backpressure meets taxes:
Faithful data collection in stochastic mobile phone sensing sys-
tems,” in 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (IN-
FOCOM), pp. 1490–1498, April 2015.
[36] Z. Feng, Y. Zhu, Q. Zhang, H. Zhu, J. Yu, J. Cao, and L. Ni,
“Towards truthful mechanisms for mobile crowdsourcing with
dynamic smartphones,” in Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE International
Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS ’14, pp. 11–20,
June 2014.
[37] A. Khan, S. K. A. Imon, and S. K. Das, “A novel localization and
coverage framework for real-time participatory urban monitor-
ing,” Pervasive and Mobile Computing, vol. 23, pp. 122 – 138, 2015.
[38] D. Zhang, H. Xiong, L. Wang, and G. Chen, “Crowdrecruiter:
Selecting participants for piggyback crowdsensing under prob-
abilistic coverage constraint,” in Proceedings of the 2014 ACM
International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing,
UbiComp ’14, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 703–714, ACM, 2014.
[39] H. Xiong, D. Zhang, G. Chen, L. Wang, and V. Gauthier, “Crowd-
tasker: Maximizing coverage quality in piggyback crowdsensing
under budget constraint,” in Pervasive Computing and Communi-
cations (PerCom), 2015 IEEE International Conference on, pp. 55–62,
March 2015.
[40] M. Zhang, P. Yang, C. Tian, S. Tang, X. Gao, B. Wang, and F. Xiao,
“Quality-aware sensing coverage in budget-constrained mobile
crowdsensing networks,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology,
vol. 65, pp. 7698–7707, Sept 2016.
[41] Y. Liu, B. Guo, Y. Wang, W. Wu, Z. Yu, and D. Zhang, “Taskme:
Multi-task allocation in mobile crowd sensing,” in Proceedings of
the 2016 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiqui-
tous Computing, UbiComp ’16, (New York, NY, USA), pp. 403–414,
ACM, 2016.
[42] Y. Ueyama, M. Tamai, Y. Arakawa, and K. Yasumoto,
“Gamification-based incentive mechanism for participatory sens-
ing,” in 2014 IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing
and Communication Workshops (PERCOM WORKSHOPS), pp. 98–
103, March 2014.
Francesco Restuccia (M’16) received his Ph.D. in Computer Science
from Missouri S&T in December 2016 under Prof. Sajal K. Das. Cur-
rently, he is a Postdoctoral Research Associate with Northeastern Uni-
versity, Boston, MA, USA. His research interests include pervasive and
mobile computing and the Internet of Things. He is a Member of the
IEEE.
Pierluca Ferraro received his Ph.D. in Computer Engineering from
the University of Palermo, Italy in 2017. His current research interests
include mobile and pervasive computing, Wireless Sensor Networks,
and Ambient Intelligence.
Simone Silvestri (M’11) graduated with honors and received his PhD
in computer science at Sapienza University of Rome, Italy. He is now
an Assistant Professor at the Computer Science Department of the
University of Kentucky. His research interests lie in the area of network
management, hybrid wireless sensor networks, interdependent cyber-
physical systems, and smart grid security. He is a Member of the IEEE.
Sajal K. Das (F’15) is the Daniel St. Clair Endowed chair in computer
science at the Missouri University of Science and Technology. He has
published more than 600 research articles in high quality journals and
refereed conference proceedings. Prof. Das is the founding Editor-in-
Chief of the Pervasive and Mobile Computing journal, and an Associate
Editor of the IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing and ACM Trans-
actions on Sensor Networks. He is a Fellow of the IEEE.
Giuseppe Lo Re (SM’11) is an Associate Professor of Computer En-
gineering at the University of Palermo. His current research interests
are in the area of computer networks and distributed systems, broadly
focusing on Wireless Sensor Networks, Ambient Intelligence, Internet of
Things. He is a Senior Member of the IEEE.
